

# 中国船东互保协会文件

中船保保字【2013】13号

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## 关于伊核问题六国与伊朗就有限放宽对伊制裁于 2013 年 11 月 23 日达成初步协议的通函

各会员公司：

2013 年 11 月 23 日，被称之为“P5+1”的伊核问题六国（美国、英国、德国、法国、俄罗斯和中国）在欧盟的推动下与伊朗达成了“第一阶段协议”，意在通过有限且可逆转的放宽对伊朗的制裁，使伊朗的铀浓缩计划暂停六个月的时间。欧盟于 2013 年 11 月 24 日发布的《联合行动计划》以及美国国务院的《情况说明书》就协议的细节做了进一步的说明。具体内容请参阅所附的两文件的副本。各方同意，磋商将继续进行下去，以便就限制伊朗核计划达成一个更加广泛和长期的协议。在这六个月期间，如果伊朗信守承诺，将不再实施新的与核有关的制裁措施。

必须认识到，协议并不意味着解除针对伊朗的所有贸易制裁。

美国国务院 2013 年 11 月 23 日公布的《情况说明书》已经确认，下述制裁仍然有效：

1. 美国就对伊贸易实施的广泛的制裁；
2. 联合国安理会实施的所有制裁；

3. 影响伊朗原油出口的制裁——伊朗将被允许动用 42 亿美元的石油销售收入，但是，当前受到削减的伊朗原油销售额度在未来的六个月内不能增加。
4. 对伊朗进口石油产品的制裁，包括“一揽子伊朗制裁法 (CISADA)”和其它法律所实施的制裁；
5. 对伊朗中央银行和其它指定银行、金融机构的制裁；
6. 对向伊朗提供包括保险在内的广泛的金融服务的制裁；
7. 绝大部分的伊朗外汇储备仍将被冻结，针对伊朗个人和公司财产的冻结措施也将继续执行；
8. 与伊朗能源、航运、造船部门进行交易，以及对伊朗长期投资和向伊朗能源部门提供技术服务所实施的制裁；
9. 针对伊朗军事计划、资助恐怖主义和滥用人权的制裁。

P5+1 各方做出的主要让步如下：

1. 六个月内不再实施与核相关的新的制裁措施；
2. 暂停某些针对黄金和贵金属以及伊朗的汽车和石油化工产品的部分制裁；
3. 同意伊朗民航部门开展与安全有关的维修、检查活动；
4. 同意以目前受到削减的额度为限购买伊朗的石油（但不会增加该额度），并且允许从该销售收入中转账 42 亿美元给伊朗；
5. 现行的对伊朗购买食品、农产品、医药和医疗设备相关的人道主义事务的豁免仍然有效。

迄今为止，P5+1 各方尚未就落实上述让步的时间和方式提供具体细节。在美国的制裁中，根据美国总统行政命令实施的制裁可以由总统来解

除，不需要经过国会批准。然而，经国会通过并由总统签署成为法律的立法制裁措施，美国总统是无权自行解除的。欧盟的相关制裁措施主要集中在欧盟第 267/2012 号决议和第 1263/2012 号修正案中。欧盟需要通过修正法案，以使上述让步生效。

在美国和欧盟通过立法修改现行制裁措施之前，所有的制裁仍然有效。国际保赔协会集团（I G）目前正在积极与英国财政部和外交部进行接触，以便了解未来数月内对伊贸易制裁的变化情况。

协会经理机构将继续关注有关贸易和保险的制裁措施的变化情况，如有进展将及时通知。

特此通函。

附件：

- 1、《联合行动计划》中文版、英文版
- 2、《情况说明书》 中文版、英文版



主题词：中船保 伊朗 制裁 通函

抄报：马董事长、张副董事长、高副董事长、各位董事

抄送：大连办事处、上海办事处、中国保赔服务（香港）有限公司

中国船东互保协会

2013 年 12 月 6 日印发

## ***Joint Plan of Action***

### ***Preamble***

The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by-step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council's consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

### ***Elements of a first step***

The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.

#### ***Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:***

- From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF<sub>6</sub> to no more than 5%. No reconversion line.
- Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

- Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant<sup>1</sup>, Fordow<sup>2</sup>, or the Arak reactor<sup>3</sup>, designated by the IAEA as IR-40.
- Beginning when the line for conversion of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% to UO<sub>2</sub> is ready, Iran has decided to convert to oxide UF<sub>6</sub> newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.
- No new locations for the enrichment.
- Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.
- No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
- Enhanced monitoring:
  - Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran's plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures.
  - Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA.
  - Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
  - Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.
  - IAEA inspector managed access to:
    - centrifuge assembly workshops<sup>4</sup>;
    - centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,
    - uranium mines and mills.

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<sup>1</sup> Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF<sub>6</sub> into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

<sup>2</sup> At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF<sub>6</sub> into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

<sup>3</sup> Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components.

<sup>4</sup> Consistent with its plans, Iran's centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines.

***In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:***

- Pause efforts to further reduce Iran's crude oil sales, enabling Iran's current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.
- Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:
  - Iran's petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services.<sup>5</sup>
  - Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.
- Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran's auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.
- License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as associated services.<sup>6</sup>
- No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.
- No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.
- The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.
- Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran's domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.
  - This channel could also enable:
    - transactions required to pay Iran's UN obligations; and,
    - direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.
- Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.

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<sup>5</sup> "Sanctions on associated services" means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.

<sup>6</sup> Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.

***Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution\****

***The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:***

- Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.
- Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.
- Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.
- Involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical-needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.
- Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
- Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).
- Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

\* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" applies.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 23, 2013

#### Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

The P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, facilitated by the European Union) has been engaged in serious and substantive negotiations with Iran with the goal of reaching a verifiable diplomatic resolution that would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

President Obama has been clear that achieving a peaceful resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is in America's national security interest. Today, the P5+1 and Iran reached a set of initial understandings that halts the progress of Iran's nuclear program and rolls it back in key respects. These are the first meaningful limits that Iran has accepted on its nuclear program in close to a decade. The initial, six month step includes significant limits on Iran's nuclear program and begins to address our most urgent concerns including Iran's enrichment capabilities; its existing stockpiles of enriched uranium; the number and capabilities of its centrifuges; and its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium using the Arak reactor. The concessions Iran has committed to make as part of this first step will also provide us with increased transparency and intrusive monitoring of its nuclear program. In the past, the concern has been expressed that Iran will use negotiations to buy time to advance their program. Taken together, these first step measures will help prevent Iran from using the cover of negotiations to continue advancing its nuclear program as we seek to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution that addresses all of the international community's concerns.

In return, as part of this initial step, the P5+1 will provide limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief to Iran. This relief is structured so that the overwhelming majority of the sanctions regime, including the key oil, banking, and financial sanctions architecture, remains in place. The P5+1 will continue to enforce these sanctions vigorously. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the limited relief and impose additional sanctions on Iran.

The P5+1 and Iran also discussed the general parameters of a comprehensive solution that would constrain Iran's nuclear program over the long term, provide verifiable assurances to the international community that Iran's nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful, and ensure that any attempt by Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon would be promptly detected. The set of understandings also includes an acknowledgment by Iran that it must address all United Nations Security Council resolutions – which Iran has long claimed are illegal – as well as past and present issues with Iran's nuclear program that have been identified by the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA). This would include resolution of questions concerning the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program, including Iran's activities at Parchin. As part of a comprehensive solution, Iran must also come into full compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its obligations to the IAEA. With respect to the comprehensive solution, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Put simply, this first step expires in six months, and does not represent an acceptable end state to the United States or our P5+1 partners.

#### Halting the Progress of Iran's Program and Rolling Back Key Elements

Iran has committed to halt enrichment above 5%:

- Halt all enrichment above 5% and dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5%.

Iran has committed to neutralize its stockpile of near-20% uranium:

- Dilute below 5% or convert to a form not suitable for further enrichment its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium before the end of the initial phase.

Iran has committed to halt progress on its enrichment capacity:

- Not install additional centrifuges of any type.
- Not install or use any next-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium.
- Leave inoperable roughly half of installed centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of installed centrifuges at Fordow, so they cannot be used to enrich uranium.
- Limit its centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines, so Iran cannot use the six months to stockpile centrifuges.
- Not construct additional enrichment facilities.

Iran has committed to halt progress on the growth of its 3.5% stockpile:

- Not increase its stockpile of 3.5% low enriched uranium, so that the amount is not greater at the end of the six months than it is at the beginning, and any newly enriched 3.5% enriched uranium is converted into oxide.

Iran has committed to no further advances of its activities at Arak and to halt progress on its plutonium track. Iran has committed to:

- Not commission the Arak reactor.
- Not fuel the Arak reactor.
- Halt the production of fuel for the Arak reactor.
- No additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor.
- Not install any additional reactor components at Arak.

- Not transfer fuel and heavy water to the reactor site.
- Not construct a facility capable of reprocessing. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel.

Unprecedented transparency and intrusive monitoring of Iran's nuclear program

Iran has committed to:

- Provide daily access by IAEA inspectors at Natanz and Fordow. This daily access will permit inspectors to review surveillance camera footage to ensure comprehensive monitoring. This access will provide even greater transparency into enrichment at these sites and shorten detection time for any non-compliance.
- Provide IAEA access to centrifuge assembly facilities.
- Provide IAEA access to centrifuge rotor component production and storage facilities.
- Provide IAEA access to uranium mines and mills.
- Provide long-sought design information for the Arak reactor. This will provide critical insight into the reactor that has not previously been available.
- Provide more frequent inspector access to the Arak reactor.
- Provide certain key data and information called for in the Additional Protocol to Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Modified Code 3.1.

Verification Mechanism

The IAEA will be called upon to perform many of these verification steps, consistent with their ongoing inspection role in Iran. In addition, the P5+1 and Iran have committed to establishing a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation and address issues that may arise. The Joint Commission will also work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present concerns with respect to Iran's nuclear program, including the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program and Iran's activities at Parchin.

Limited, Temporary, Reversible Relief

In return for these steps, the P5+1 is to provide limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief while maintaining the vast bulk of our sanctions, including the oil, finance, and banking sanctions architecture. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the relief. Specifically the P5+1 has committed to:

- Not impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months, if Iran abides by its commitments under this deal, to the extent permissible within their political systems.
- Suspend certain sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran's auto sector, and Iran's petrochemical exports, potentially providing Iran approximately \$1.5 billion in revenue.
- License safety-related repairs and inspections inside Iran for certain Iranian airlines.

- Allow purchases of Iranian oil to remain at their currently significantly reduced levels – levels that are 60% less than two years ago. \$4.2 billion from these sales will be allowed to be transferred in installments if, and as, Iran fulfills its commitments.
- Allow \$400 million in governmental tuition assistance to be transferred from restricted Iranian funds directly to recognized educational institutions in third countries to defray the tuition costs of Iranian students.

#### Humanitarian Transaction

Facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already allowed by U.S. law. Humanitarian transactions have been explicitly exempted from sanctions by Congress so this channel will not provide Iran access to any new source of funds. Humanitarian transactions are those related to Iran's purchase of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices; we would also facilitate transactions for medical expenses incurred abroad. We will establish this channel for the benefit of the Iranian people.

#### Putting Limited Relief in Perspective

In total, the approximately \$7 billion in relief is a fraction of the costs that Iran will continue to incur during this first phase under the sanctions that will remain in place. The vast majority of Iran's approximately \$100 billion in foreign exchange holdings are inaccessible or restricted by sanctions.

In the next six months, Iran's crude oil sales cannot increase. Oil sanctions alone will result in approximately \$30 billion in lost revenues to Iran – or roughly \$5 billion per month – compared to what Iran earned in a six month period in 2011, before these sanctions took effect. While Iran will be allowed access to \$4.2 billion of its oil sales, nearly \$15 billion of its revenues during this period will go into restricted overseas accounts. In summary, we expect the balance of Iran's money in restricted accounts overseas will actually increase, not decrease, under the terms of this deal.

#### Maintaining Economic Pressure on Iran and Preserving Our Sanctions Architecture

During the first phase, we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions against Iran, including by taking action against those who seek to evade or circumvent our sanctions.

- Sanctions affecting crude oil sales will continue to impose pressure on Iran's government. Working with our international partners, we have cut Iran's oil sales from 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in early 2012 to 1 million bpd today, denying Iran the ability to sell almost 1.5 million bpd. That's a loss of more than \$80 billion since the beginning of 2012 that Iran will never be able to recoup. Under this first step, the EU crude oil ban will remain in effect and Iran will be held to approximately 1 million bpd in sales, resulting in continuing lost sales worth an additional \$4 billion per month, every month, going forward.
- Sanctions affecting petroleum product exports to Iran, which result in billions of dollars of lost revenue, will remain in effect.
- The vast majority of Iran's approximately \$100 billion in foreign exchange holdings remain inaccessible or restricted by our sanctions.

- Other significant parts of our sanctions regime remain intact, including:
  - o Sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran and approximately two dozen other major Iranian banks and financial actors;
  - o Secondary sanctions, pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) as amended and other laws, on banks that do business with U.S.-designated individuals and entities;
  - o Sanctions on those who provide a broad range of other financial services to Iran, such as many types of insurance; and,
  - o Restricted access to the U.S. financial system.
- All sanctions on over 600 individuals and entities targeted for supporting Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile program remain in effect.
- Sanctions on several sectors of Iran's economy, including shipping and shipbuilding, remain in effect.
- Sanctions on long-term investment in and provision of technical services to Iran's energy sector remain in effect.
- Sanctions on Iran's military program remain in effect.
- Broad U.S. restrictions on trade with Iran remain in effect, depriving Iran of access to virtually all dealings with the world's biggest economy
- All UN Security Council sanctions remain in effect.
- All of our targeted sanctions related to Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism, its destabilizing role in the Syrian conflict, and its abysmal human rights record, among other concerns, remain in effect.

#### A Comprehensive Solution

During the six-month initial phase, the P5+1 will negotiate the contours of a comprehensive solution. Thus far, the outline of the general parameters of the comprehensive solution envisions concrete steps to give the international community confidence that Iran's nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful. With respect to this comprehensive resolution: nothing is agreed to with respect to a comprehensive solution until everything is agreed to. Over the next six months, we will determine whether there is a solution that gives us sufficient confidence that the Iranian program is peaceful. If Iran cannot address our concerns, we are prepared to increase sanctions and pressure.

#### Conclusion

In sum, this first step achieves a great deal in its own right. Without this phased agreement, Iran could start spinning thousands of additional centrifuges. It could install and spin next-generation centrifuges that will reduce its breakout times. It could fuel and commission the Arak heavy water reactor. It could grow its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to beyond the threshold for a bomb's

worth of uranium. Iran can do none of these things under the conditions of the first step understanding.

Furthermore, without this phased approach, the international sanctions coalition would begin to fray because Iran would make the case to the world that it was serious about a diplomatic solution and we were not. We would be unable to bring partners along to do the crucial work of enforcing our sanctions. With this first step, we stop and begin to roll back Iran's program and give Iran a sharp choice: fulfill its commitments and negotiate in good faith to a final deal, or the entire international community will respond with even more isolation and pressure.

The American people prefer a peaceful and enduring resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and strengthens the global non-proliferation regime. This solution has the potential to achieve that. Through strong and principled diplomacy, the United States of America will do its part for greater peace, security, and cooperation among nations.

(本译文仅供参考，实际内容以英文版本为准)

2013 年 11 月 24 日，日内瓦

## 联合行动计划

### 前言

本轮谈判的目的是达成一个双边认可的、长期而全面的解决方案，以确保伊朗的核计划专门用于和平的目的。伊朗重申，在任何情况下都不寻求或发展任何核武器。全面解决方案将以下述初步协议措施为基石，并在双方认可的时限内达成最终步骤，以解决国际社会关注问题。全面解决方案将使伊朗充分享有《核不扩散条约》规定的和平利用核能的权利，并承担相应的条约义务。全面解决方案将包含一个由双方共同界定的铀浓缩计划，该计划具有实际的限制和透明度措施，以确保计划的和平性质。全面解决方案将构成一个环环相扣的有机整体，任何一个环节缺乏共识都会使整个方案夭折。全面解决方案将是一个互惠的、渐进的过程，并将产生全面取消联合国安理会、多边及各国对伊朗核计划的制裁的效果。

在初步措施和最终步骤之间还将有许多附加的步骤，包括处理联合国安理会决议的问题，此举意在使联合国安理会在此问题上得出一个令人满意的结论。E3+3 各方和伊朗有义务完成并落实双方约定的短期措施和具有诚意的全面解决方案。E3/EURO+3 各方将和伊朗建立一个联合委员会以监督短期措施的落实情况，并处理在此过程中可能出现的问题。国际原子能机构负责核查与核相关的措施。联合委员会将与国际原子能机构一起推动解决国际社会过去和现在所关注的问题。

### 初步协议的要素

初步协议将是有时限的，期限为六个月的时间，经双方同意可以续期。在此期间，各方均应努力维持建设性氛围以便开展有诚意的磋商。

伊朗将自愿采取如下措施：

- 将现有的浓度为 20 % 的浓缩铀保留一半，作为制造浓度为 20 % 的氧化燃料的日常储备，后者将用于制造德黑兰研究反应堆 (TRR) 所用燃料。将剩余浓度为 20 % 的六氟化铀 (UF<sub>6</sub>) 稀释为不超过 5 %，并且不将其进行复原处理。
- 伊朗宣布，在为期六个月的时间内不再生产浓度超过 5 % 的浓缩铀。
- 伊朗宣布，将不在纳坦兹 (Natanz) 铀浓缩厂<sup>1</sup>、福尔道 (Fordow) 燃料浓缩厂<sup>2</sup>、阿拉克 (Arak) 反应堆<sup>3</sup> 和国际原子能机构指定的 IR-40 重水堆进一步开展浓缩活动。
- 伊朗已经决定，当浓度为 5 % 的 UF<sub>6</sub> 转换成 UO<sub>2</sub> 的处理工艺准备完毕时，伊朗将在六个月的时间内按照向国际原子能机构所申报的转换装置操作计划将新生产的浓度为 5 % 的 UF<sub>6</sub> 进行转换。
- 不会在新的地点开展浓缩活动。
- 伊朗将继续其处于监督之下的研发实践 (R&D Practices) 活动，包括目前开展的不以积累浓缩铀为目标的研究实践活动。
- 不再进行核燃料的再加工或是建设具有核燃料再加工能力的工厂。
- 加强监督：
  - 向国际原子能机构提供指定的信息，包括伊朗核设施相关计划的信息，每个核地点的每幢建筑物的信息，对每个开展核活动地点的操作规模的信息，铀矿和工厂的信息和原材料来源的信息。上述信息将由伊朗在前述措施实施之日起三个月内提供伊。
  - 就国际原子能机构称作的 IR-40 的阿拉克反应堆，向国际原子能机构提交一份更新后的设计调查问卷 (DIQ)。
  - 要对国际原子能机构就阿拉克反应堆（国际原子能机构称作 IR-40 重水堆）做出的安全监管结论表示认可。

<sup>1</sup>也就是在六个月的时间内，伊朗除不进行铀浓缩活动以外，将不会为已安装的离心机提供 UF<sub>6</sub>。不另行安装离心机。伊朗宣布在第一个六个月期间，将用同样类型的离心机替换现有的离心机。

<sup>2</sup>不在福尔道燃料浓缩厂目前进行铀浓缩活动的四组离心机进行浓度超过 5 % 的铀浓缩活动。不为其它 12 组离心机提供 UF<sub>6</sub>，保持停运状态。不在各组之间进行相互连接。伊朗宣布在第一个六个月期间，将用同样类型的离心机替换现有的离心机。

<sup>3</sup>就国际社会对在阿拉克建设反应堆的担心，伊朗确认，在六个月内不会使反应堆进入到工作状态或向反应堆的地点运送燃料或重水，不会为反应堆试验其它的燃料或生产更多的燃料，不会为反应堆安装剩余的组件。

- 国际原子能机构的核查人员不在现场的时的日常检查，目的是对设计资料、临时库存、物理库存进行验证，进行突击检查是为了接触到纳坦兹铀浓缩厂和福尔道燃料浓缩厂的离线监督记录。
- 国际原子能机构核查人员能够设法进入：
  - 离心机组装车间<sup>4</sup>；
  - 离心机转子的生产车间和储存设施；
  - 铀矿和工厂。

作为回报，E3/EU+3 各方将主动施行以下措施：

- 中止进一步削减伊朗原油销售的努力，使现有客户能够购买其当前平均数量的原油。使扣押于海外的已同意的交易资金回笼。就此部分原油销售，暂停欧盟和美国针对保险和运输的制裁措施。
- 暂停美国和欧盟针对下述内容的制裁措施：
  - 伊朗的石化产品出口，以及相关服务的制裁措施<sup>5</sup>。
  - 黄金和贵金属，以及相关服务的制裁措施。
- 暂停美国针对伊朗汽车业的制裁措施，以及相关服务的制裁措施。
- 批准事关伊朗民航飞行安全及相关服务的备件供应及安装。批准伊朗进行与安全相关的检验、修理及相关服务活动<sup>6</sup>。
- 联合国安理会不再实施新的与核有关的制裁措施。
- 欧盟不再实施新的与核有关的制裁措施。
- 美国当局，根据美国总统和国会各自的职能，将不再实施新的与核有关的制裁措施。
- 运用伊朗被扣押在海外的原油销售收入建立一条金融渠道，以加快伊朗应对国内人道主义需求的贸易措施。人道主义贸易被定义为涉及食物和农产品、医药、医疗设施以及在在外国发生的医疗费用的交易。本渠道

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<sup>4</sup>与计划一致的是，伊朗在六个月内生产的离心机将用于替代损坏的机器。

<sup>5</sup> “相关服务的制裁措施”中的服务系指任何服务，例如保险、运输、或者金融服务，具体内容根据美国或者欧盟实际制裁措施而定，只要其与制裁措施相关且能用于促进制裁。

<sup>6</sup> 放松制裁可能涉及伊朗航空以及任何未指定的伊朗的航空公司

将包含指定的外国银行以及未指定的伊朗银行，后者将在该渠道建立时确定。

➤ 该渠道也可用于

- 从事以支付联合国安理会债务为目的的交易，以及
- 为伊朗海外留学生支付为期六个月的大学学费。

- 提高欧盟非制裁贸易的授权交易门槛至约定数额。

#### 全面解决方案最终阶段的要素\*

全面解决方案的最终阶段旨在终结谈判及在本文件被采纳后一年内开始实施，其将，

- 包含一个长期的但具体时间有待商定的持续区间。
- 反映当事各方对于《不扩散核武器条约(NPT)》和国际原子能机构(IAEA)安全保障协议的权利与义务。
- 全面取消联合国安理会、多边及国家的与核有关的制裁措施，包括涉及贸易、技术、金融及能源领域的制裁措施，但取消制裁的具体时间表有待商定。
- 在一个待定的期间内引入一个由双方共同定义的铀浓缩计划。该计划涉及的相关参数将由双方协商确定并应与实际的需求相一致，需要限制的铀浓缩活动的范围和级别、生产能力，包括进行铀浓缩活动的地点、浓缩铀的库存，都将由双方协商确定。
- 完全化解对于被国际原子能机构称作 IR-40 的阿拉克核反应堆的担心。不再进行核燃料再加工，或者建设能够进行核燃料再加工的设施。
- 全面贯彻双方约定的透明做法及强化监督措施。依据伊朗总统和议会各自的职能批准和实施附加议定书。
- 包含国际民用核计划合作，其中包括获取现代轻水动力和研究用反应堆及相关设备，还包括供应现代核燃料以及约定的研发实践活动。

伴随全面解决方案最后阶段的成功实施，伊朗核计划将受到与《不扩散核武器条约（NPT）》的非核武器签约国一样的对待。

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\* 在最终阶段以及任何中间阶段，将适用“在所有事情均达成一致之前，什么都不作数”的原则。

(本译文仅供参考，实际内容以英文版本为准)

白宫

新闻秘书办公室

立即发表

2013 年 11 月 23 日

情况说明书：关于伊朗伊斯兰共和国核计划的第一阶段共识

为了阻止伊朗拥有核武器，P5+1（美国，英国，德国，法国，俄罗斯以及中国）各方在欧盟的推动下与伊朗进行了严肃而务实的磋商，以期达成一个可经验证的外交解决方案。

奥巴马总统已经明确表示，通过和平方式阻止伊朗拥有核武器符合美国的国家安全利益。今天，P5+1各方与伊朗就暂停伊朗核计划进程以及在关键方面退回到之前状态达成了一系列的初步共识。这是近10年来伊朗首次接受针对其核计划的有实质内容的限制措施。第一阶段为期六个月，其中包含针对伊朗核计划的重要限制措施，并开始涉及我们最为关心的几个问题。这些问题包括伊朗的铀浓缩能力、其现有的浓缩铀存量、离心机的数量及其处理能力，以及使用Arak反应堆生产武器级钚的能力。作为第一阶段行动的一部分，伊朗承诺的让步包括提高其核计划的透明度及介入监管的力度。以往，国际社会对于伊朗利用谈判为其核计划争取时间的担心十分明显。对此，第一阶段行动所采取的措施将有助于防止伊朗利用谈判之机继续推进其核计划。同时，我们也将继续与伊朗进行协商，以期寻求一个长期的、全面的解决方案来应对国际社会关注的所有问题。

作为回报,同时也是第一阶段计划的一部分,六方将会针对伊朗实行有限的、临时的、有针对性且可撤销的放松制裁的措施。这个措施是结构性的,因而制裁措施中的绝大多数都将予以保留,包括最为核心的石油业,银行业,以及金融制裁等等。P5+1 各方仍将继续积极地执行这些制裁措施。如果伊朗没能履行其承诺,我们将撤回现有的放松制裁的措施并将加大对其制裁的力度。

六方与伊朗也同时讨论了全面解决方案的基本要素,包括限制伊朗长期发展核计划,使国际社会相信伊朗的核计划将完全用于和平的目的,以及及时甄别伊朗获得核武器的企图。这一系列的共识同样包括伊朗必须承认联合国安理会的有关决议,这些决议曾经长期被伊朗宣称为非法,伊朗同时也必须承认国际原子能机构过去以及当前认定的与伊朗核计划有关的争议问题。这些共识还将解决对于伊朗核计划的军事用途的疑问,包括其在 Parchin 地区的活动。作为全面解决方案的一部分,伊朗必须全面履行其在《不扩散核武器条约》下以及国际原子能机构中的义务。对于这个全面解决方案,除非双方就每一个细节都达成共识,否则方案并不生效。简而言之,第一阶段行动将在六个月后终止,但其无论是对于美国自身还是 P5+1 的合作伙伴,都不代表全面解决方案已经达到了可接受的最终状态。

### **暂停伊朗的核计划进程并使之退回到之前状态的关键要素**

伊朗已经承诺暂停浓度在 5%以上的铀浓缩活动:

- 暂停所有浓度在 5%以上铀浓缩活动并且拆除与之相关的设施。

伊朗已经同意销毁其库存的浓度接近 20%的浓缩铀:

- 在初步阶段协议终止前将其库存的浓度接近 20%的浓缩铀稀释至 5%以

下，或将其转换为另一种不适于再浓缩的形式。

伊朗已经同意暂停其铀浓缩能力的开发进程：

- 不安装任何形式的新的离心机。
- 不安装或使用用于铀浓缩活动的任何下一代离心机。
- 停用安装在 Natanz 的大约一半左右的离心机，以及在 Fordow 的四分之三的离心机，目的是使其不再被用于铀浓缩活动。
- 离心机的生产仅限于替换已经损坏的设备，以防伊朗在六个月内积蓄离心机。
- 不建设新的铀浓缩设施。

伊朗承诺不再增加其 3.5%浓度的浓缩铀的库存：

- 不再增加其 3.5%浓度的低浓缩铀的库存量，其六个月后的库存量不得比第一阶段行动开始前高，任何新生产的 3.5%浓缩铀必须转化为氧化物。

伊朗已经承诺不在 Arak 地区进行任何活动，同时暂停其与钚有关的活动。伊朗承诺：

- 不使用 Arak 反应堆。
- 不为 Arak 反应堆添加燃料。
- 暂停生产 Arak 反应堆需要的燃料。
- 不再对 Arak 反应堆的燃料进行测试。
- 不在 Arak 地区新置任何反应堆零件。
- 不再向反应堆运送燃料和重水。
- 不建造具有再加工能力的设备。不经再加工，伊朗将不能从用过的燃料中提取钚。

## 伊朗核计划前所未有的透明度及介入监管力度

伊朗已经承诺：

- 由在 Natanz 和 Fordow 地区的国际原子能机构视察人员每天进行检查。  
每日检查将允许检查员查看监控录像以确保全面的监控。此项举措将使这些地区的铀浓缩活动更具透明度，并能在更短的时间内发现不遵守约定的任何情形。
- 授权国际原子能机构进入检查离心机装配设施。
- 授权国际原子能机构进入检查离心机转子的生产及储存设施。
- 授权国际原子能机构进入检查铀矿及工厂。
- 提供 Arak 反应堆的长期寻求的设计资料，这将提供对该反应堆的关键的洞察力。该反应堆的设计资料之前一直未对外开放。
- 授权核查人员对 Arak 反应堆进入更频密的检查。
- 提供国际原子能机构伊朗安全监管协议附加议定书和修订准则 3.1 节要求的某些核心数据与信息。

## 查证机制

国际原子能机构在履行其本职工作的同时，将会进行大量的查证工作。另外，六方及伊朗已经同意成立一个联合委员会来配合原子能机构履行其职责及处理可能发生的问题。联合委员会也将与国际原子能机构共同努力以便促进伊朗核问题的解决，包括伊朗发展核计划的军事用途以及伊朗在 Parchin 地区的活动。

## 有限的、临时性的、可撤销的宽松措施

作为对伊朗承诺的回应，六方同意做出有限的、暂时性的、有针对性且可撤

销的宽松措施，同时保留原有制裁措施里的大部分内容，包括石油、金融以及银行业的制裁。如果伊朗未能履行其承诺，我们将会取消宽松措施。六方特别声明：

- 如果伊朗信守承诺，P5+1 各方在六个月内将在其各自政治体制允许的范围内不再新增针对伊朗核计划的制裁措施。
- 暂停针对黄金及其他贵金属、伊朗汽车制造业、石油化工品出口的制裁措施，这些计划预计会给伊朗带来 15 亿美元的财政收入。
- 允许某些伊朗航空公司在国内进行与安全相关的维修、检查活动。
- 允许购买伊朗石油，但以当前已被大幅削减的水平为限。该水平比两年前减少了 60%。假如伊朗践行承诺，将被允许分批动用总额为 42 亿美元的石油销售收入。
- 允许从受限的伊朗资金中转移 4 亿美元的政府助学金到第三国指定教育机构，用于支付伊朗学生的学费。

## 人道主义事务

促进美国法律允许的人道主义事务。人道主义事务在国会公布的制裁中已被明确豁免，因此这个渠道不会给伊朗提供新的资金来源。人道主义事务是指伊朗购买与食品、农产品、药品以及医疗设备有关的事务。我们也将为其与海外发生的医疗费用有关的事务提供便利。我们将建立这些符合伊朗人民利益的渠道。

## 正确看待有限度的宽松政策

总体来说，在第一阶段宽松政策中涉及的大约 70 亿美元只占其受制裁总额的一小部分，而制裁措施总体上依然有效。伊朗大约 1000 亿美元的外汇储备中的绝大部分仍然是受到严格制裁的。

在接下来的六个月中，伊朗原油销售不会增加。与制裁措施生效前的 2011 年的半年收入相比，仅石油制裁一项就将使伊朗总收入减少大约 300 亿美元，或者说每个月大约 50 亿美元。尽管伊朗将获准动用 42 亿美元的石油销售收入，但在此期间也会有近 150 亿美元的营业收入流入受限制的海外账户。总之，根据本次交易的条件，我们预期受到限制的伊朗海外账户的货币余额将会增加，而不是减少。

### 保持对伊朗的经济压力以及保留我们的制裁体系

在协议实施的最初阶段，我们将继续严格执行对伊朗的制裁措施，包括采取行动防止有人设法逃避或者规避我们的制裁措施。

- 影响原油销售的制裁措施将继续对伊朗政府施加压力。通过与国际伙伴的合作，我们已经将伊朗的原油销售从 2012 年初的每天 250 万桶削减到今天的每天 100 万桶，等于每天削减了伊朗近 150 万桶的销售能力。由此给伊朗造成的损失从 2012 年初算起已超过 800 亿美元，该损失伊朗将永远无法收回。在第一阶段，欧盟原油禁令将继续有效。据此，每天将有约 100 万桶的伊朗石油销售收入受到控制，由此导致伊朗每个的月销售损失价值将达 40 亿美元，且该数额将随着时间流逝逐月增加。
- 影响石油产品出口到伊朗的制裁措施仍将有效，该措施将导致数以亿计的美元收入损失。
- 受制裁措施影响，总额约 1000 亿美元的伊朗外汇储备中的绝大多数仍然不能动用或者受到严格限制。
- 我们制裁机制中的其他重要部分原封未动，其中包括：
  - 针对伊朗中央银行以及其他二十几家主要伊朗银行及金融机构的制裁；
  - 依据经修订的《一揽子伊朗制裁法》及其他法律，对与美国指定的个人

或者实体做生意的银行实施的次级制裁；

- 针对向伊朗提供广泛金融服务的人实施的制裁，例如许多类型的保险，以及，
- 限制进入美国金融体系。
- 针对向伊朗的核计划或者弹道飞弹计划提供帮助的超过600个个人和实体的制裁措施仍然有效。
- 针对伊朗的几个经济部门的制裁仍然有效，包括航运及造船部门。
- 针对向伊朗能源部门进行长期投资及提供技术服务的制裁仍然有效。
- 针对伊朗军事计划的制裁仍然有效。
- 美国就对伊朗贸易实施的范围广泛的限制措施仍然有效，该措施使伊朗丧失了几乎所有与世界经济强国交易的机会。
- 联合国安理会实施的所有制裁措施仍然有效。
- 所有有针对性的制裁措施仍然有效，包括针对伊朗资助恐怖主义的制裁措施，针对其在叙利亚冲突中的破坏性角色的制裁措施，以及滥用人权的制裁措施。

## 全面解决方案

在为期六个月的第一阶段，P5+1各方将就全面解决方案的整体轮廓进行谈判。迄今为止，关于全面解决方案基本原则的构想是，要通过采取实质性措施使国际社会确信伊朗的核计划将专门用于和平的目的。关于全面解决方案：除非每个环节都能够达成共识，否则什么都不作数。在未来的六个月内，我们将决定，是否会有一个解决方案使我们确信伊朗核计划将用于和平目的。如果伊朗不能消除我们的担心，我们准备增加制裁措施及施加更大的压力。

## 结论

总而言之,第一步的迈出本身就是一个巨大的进步。没有分阶段进行的协议,伊朗可以让成千上万的新离心机开始运转。伊朗可以安装和运转新一代的离心机,这会减少其取得突破的时间。伊朗可以向Arak重水反应堆添加燃料,并使其进入到工作状态。伊朗可以增加浓度为20%的浓缩铀的贮备以超越制造核弹的门槛。根据初步协议条件的限制,上述事情伊朗都无法进行。

此外,不采取分阶段进行的方法,国际制裁阵线将会出现裂痕。原因在于伊朗可以向世界表明,它对通过外交方式达成解决方案是认真的,而我们则恰恰相反。我们将无法将盟国团结在一起,共同进行加强制裁这一至关重要的工作。随着初步协议的实施,我们将阻止并开始终止伊朗的核计划,还将使伊朗面临一个严峻的选择:或者履行承诺并就最终解决方案开展有诚意地谈判,或者被整个国际社会孤立并承受由此带来的沉重压力。

美国人民更喜欢一个和平而且持久的解决方案,以便阻止伊朗获得核武器及强化全球的核不扩散体系。最终解决方案很可能实现上述目标。美利坚合众国将通过强有力的且富于原则性的外交手段,为各国之间的和平、安全与合作做出自己的努力。