Shortly after the massive container collapse on the Japanese-flagged containership ONE APUS, the Danish shipping giant Maersk announced on its official website that Maersk Essen 051N, a TP6 vessel experienced heavy weather on the 16th January 2021 while en route from Xiamen, China to Los Angeles, California, which has resulted in approximately 750 containers overboard – along with additional damaged containers onboard. Similar incidents were also reported by liner shipping companies like Evergreen and ZIM. Following the several high-profile incidents recently, containers lost overboard has again sparked alarm as substantial loss were suffered by the industry in current surge of container freight rates.

I. Incidents of containers loss at sea

The World Shipping Council (WSC) estimates that there were on average a total of 1,382 containers lost at sea each year in the period between 2008 and 2019. Although causes for these incidents were not detailed in the WSC report, parametric rolling of ships in heavy weather conditions is known to be a predominant risk factor, according to industry analysis. Since 2020 as per public disclosure, there have been 9 incidents globally where a total of 3,067 containers were lost overboard.

24 May 2020, containership APL ENGLAND (55,510 TEU) lost 40 containers in rough seas after temporary power loss some 40 nm SE of Sydney. 74 containers were damaged.

July 2020, containership MSC PALAK (9,408 TEU) lost 22 containers off Algoa Bay, South Africa and was released from detention by local authority a week later.

30 October 2020, containership ONE AQUILA lost at least 100 containers overboard in North Pacific while en route from Yantian to Long Beach and was later rerouted to the Port of Tacoma.

20 November 2020, containership SEROJA LIMA (8,540 TEU) lost 27 containers in the Atlantic in the vicinity of 38-40N 019-30W, East of Azores, when sailing from Suez to New York.

30 November 2020, containership ONE APUS (14,052 TEU) en route to Long Beach from Yantian Port lost 1,816 containers overboard in heavy weather, record number of lost containers in African waters. The loss is anticipated to reach US$200m.

2 December 2020, containership MUNICH MAERSK (20,568 TEU) lost up to 200 containers some 90 nm north of Schiemonnikoog island.

2 January 2021, containership EVER LIBERAL (9,466 TEU) lost 36x40’ containers overboard with an additional 21x40’ containers collapsing on board when it encountered heavy seas and strong winds around 20 nm Southwest of Kyushu, Japan after leaving the Port of Busan for Los Angeles.

January 2021, ZIM reported an incident of 76 containers lost overboard of a containership leaving Korea for its destination in South America.

16 January 2021, Maersk Essen 051N (13,092 TEU) experienced heavy weather while en route from Xiamen, China to Los Angeles, California. Approximately 750 containers fell overboard along with additional damaged containers onboard.

II. Causes of containers loss at sea

The shipping world has been studying the reasons for loss of containers at sea for many years. However, it never has a single cause but rather is a multifaced threat where stowage, lashing, navigation, weather and sea conditions should all be considered.

1. Improper container stowage

Large liner companies generally have inhouse pre-planning centre to facilitate container turnover. Prior to the ship’s arrival at the loading port, the port captain and the terminal stowage centre would carry out pre-planning, taking into account the ship’s capacity and the space on board. Although the plan will be finalised on ship, significant changes to the plan are not expected by the company or the stowage centre as so many steps may be involved including warehousing, transportation, ship’s arriving and cargo loading. Safety considerations are likely to be compromised with freight soaring nowadays. Also, most planners are not experienced masters/chief officers who understand all risk factors on board, which may later affect proper lashing or the ship’s stability.

2. Uneven distribution of weight

For stowage of containerised cargo, aspects such as the ship’s stability, strength, draught, as well as navigation watchkeeping and lashing forces should be considered. Ships that are arranged to load more containers in a booming market, even with other requirements satisfied, tend to have higher container stacks and therefore reduced stability and extended roll period. With greater heeling moment and severe forces to be expected, twistlocks and sockets may be damaged and further leading to the collapse of container stacks.

Even with heavy containers loaded under deck and light/empty containers on deck, which is a common practice for recent China bound vessels from the US, the GM value may become excessive. According to an experienced chief officer of OOCL, a container ship with 13,000 TEU may leave a US port with a GM of 8 metres and a rolling period of 11 seconds. It is therefore imaginable that chances of containers loss at sea when the twistlocks are unlocked are high in severe rolling and pitching in heavy weather. There are also cases of misdeclaration at certain ports, though statutory requirement for container weight verification has been established.

3. Improper lashing and securing

Tens of thousands of locking devices are used on large containerships, and many can be damaged due to rough operation by the stevedores or natural wear and tear. Although we can trust the stevedores to not use the damaged locks, it is likely that some damaged ones got mixed up and each used can be a potential threat to safe stowage.

Container lashing can be a very arduous and technically demanding work. A standard automatic twistlock weighs about 6.5 kg, a turnbuckle weighs about 12 kg, a short lashing bar is about 12-13 kg and a long one is 22 kg. Chances of improper operations, such as failure to secure turnbuckles or engage latches, can be high for the heavy and intensive lashing work.

4. Insufficient crew participation

On large container vessels that carry thousands or even over ten thousand TEUs, there are not enough trained professionals to execute cargo lashing and securing, and it’s basically impractical to have the crew monitoring the placement and tightening of lashing materials and locking devices both ashore and on board. Even improper lashing or securing is found before departure, it’s hard to demand correction by the stevedores and then masters are left with no choice but to set sail under the tight schedule.

There are also examples of cutting lashing arrangements due to missing or inadequate locking devices, like when stevedores leave the locks on the dock or on the crane.

Most locking devices are used in the lashing of containers during transportation while only a small number of equipment such as lashing bars, turnbuckles and lashing eyes can be maintained by the crew at sea. Where other spare equipment is kept on deck is not easily accessible and therefore the crews can hardly maintain or repair those locking devices during the voyage.

Loading of containers not in conformity with the pre-stowage plan may cause undue vertical weight distribution on an individual container stack or excessive lashing forces, of which masters and chief officers are unaware until they receive the final plan. At that time cargo loading is completed, the crane is removed, and stevedores have left, it takes tremendous work of coordination to adjust or even restow the loaded containers. Although the issue may be commonplace in ports that are not operated in a good standard, no perfect solution has yet been found even owners and charterers are both informed of the situation. By then, only good seamanship can be counted on to ensure safety at sea.

5. Heavy weather

Among the 9 incidents listed above, 6 involved heavy weather, which is often the most common factor resulting in container lost overboard. It’s also worth noting that although weather routing, which provides theoretically the optimal route, is used on most ships, it is likely that the weather information provided disagree with the actual observation on ships. Let’s put aside the question about whether safety considerations are fully covered in recommended routes with the freight soaring. It is the master who is often held accountable when the vessel deviates from the recommended route, while service providers basically can’t help when the actual condition differs from the forecast.

In an increasing number of ship speed and consumption disputes, data of weather routing systems are getting admitted at courts while master’s report and logbook information are less effective. Under great commercial pressure, masters are now less willing to challenge the recommendations, passively assuming that weather routing should be blamed for loss of containers at sea as long as they follow its advice.

III. Industry efforts to improve safety

Although containers lost overboard represent only a small portion of the 226 million containers currently shipped each year, the economic loss arising out of such incidents cannot be split but to be borne by shipping companies and insurers. The liner shipping industry has hence been committed to enhancing container safety with its partners, including:

1. The SOLAS Convention was amended to make verification of container weights a legally binding condition for vessel loading. This can effectively prevent misdeclaration of container weights and further reduce loss of containers at sea.
2. The IMO, ILO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), with industry support, produced a code of practice for the packing of CTU. The code has outlined specific procedures to improve safety and was approved in late 2014.
3. In support of the IMO’s efforts to enhance container safety, the ISO revised its standards regarding lashing equipment and corner castings and the new standards went into effect in 2015.
4. WSC proposed to the IMO’s Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC) in September 2019 to align the Safe Container Convention’s and ISO1496-1 container stacking strength requirements, noting that the existing discrepancy might have contributed to loss of containers at sea.
5. WSC, together with the European Union, has submitted a proposal for a new output on the mandatory reporting of containers lost at sea to IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee. The liner shipping industry supports such a mandatory reporting requirement and will continue to advocate for an early implementation of an effective and practical requirement.
6. IMO revised its guidelines for the inspection programs for cargo transport unit and clarified that the selection criteria should be equally applied to CTUs carrying all types of cargoes. The revision has adequately referred to the IMO/ILO/UNECE Code of Practice for Packing of Cargo Transport Units.

IV. What else can we do?

Preventing loss of containers at sea requires efforts from not only ships, but also the entire industry. For container liner companies and ships, at least the following things should be taken care of.

1. Carefully review the pre stowage plan and demand prompt modifications to the plan according to feedback from the ship.
2. The master should make reasonable arrangement for checking the inventory of spare locking devices, as well as repairing and replacement of damaged ones. Have a designated person watch for missing locks at the wharf prior to departure.
3. Once the pre stowage plan is confirmed by the ship, any changes to the plan should be made with consent of the ship, which is hard but should be insisted.
4. Seafarers should carry out full and detailed inspections of the lashing condition, including on the securing or tightening of lashing rods, tensioners, sockets and automatic twistlocks.
5. The master and chief officer may arrange inspections during the voyage, weather permitting, to tight or secure the sockets, tensioners, safety pins or lashing rods. If any automatic twistlock is found to be malfunctioning or dislocated, remove it for repair or replacement immediately after discharge of containers.
6. The master should be able to challenge weather routing when it conflicts with the actual conditions, and evidence such as photos, videos, logbooks, master’s declarations will be strong evidence in the event of any charterparty disputes.

For more information, please contact Managers of the Association.