The safety of crews and passengers is of paramount importance for ships engaged in commercial activities at sea. In terms of international maritime law, the shipping community has long required ships to carry appropriate life-saving equipment, such as lifeboats, for use by crews and passengers in the event of an emergency at sea. However, lifeboats have caused countless accidents during drills resulting in injuries and deaths. InterManager has collated figures which date back to 1981 and found that there have been 419 deaths involving lifeboats, 346 serious injuries and 116 minor injuries. Needless to say, such fatalities can be and should be avoided.

I. SOLAS requirements

With lessons learnt from the Titanic disaster taken into account, the SOLAS Convention was adopted in 1914 to first address life-saving appliances and arrangements.

The International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code was later adopted in 1996 by MSC at its 66th session by resolution MSC.48(66) to provide specific technical requirements for the manufacturing, testing, maintenance and record-keeping with regard to life-saving appliances. It has since then set a minimum standard in ensuring safety of lives despite differences in number and size of life-saving appliances as well as ship types and routes.

It is provided in regulation 19.3.3.3, Chapter III of the SOLAS Convention that each lifeboat shall be launched with its assigned operating crew aboard and manoeuvred in the water at least once every three months. However, the regulation does not require the assigned operating crew to be on board when the lifeboat is launched, which was further clarified by MSC in 2009 at its 86th session by MSC.1/Circ.1326. The committee agreed that the assigned operating crew should not be required to be on board lifeboats during launching, unless the master, within the authority conferred to him by the ISM Code considered that the lifeboat should be launched with the assigned operating crew on board, taking into account all safety aspects.

II. Main causes of accidents

The MSC has emphasized at its 81st session in 2006 that fatalities with relation to lifeboat drills and tests are unacceptable, with the following categories covering the overwhelming majority of such accidents.

  1. the failure of the on-load release mechanism;
  2. the accidental usage of the on-load release mechanism;
  3. the insufficient maintenance of lifeboats, launch equipment and davits;
  4. failures in communication;
  5. a lack of familiarity with lifeboats and the associated equipment;
  6. unsafe practices during lifeboat inspections and drills, and
  7. other design faults.

Further, Lloyd’s Register has used an artificial intelligence solution to examine the raw data from InterManager’s lifeboat accident database, and shared new insights into the main causes, hazards and trends surrounding lifeboat accidents. Main findings include:

  1. Human beings were not the primary cause of lifeboat accidents.
  2. 8% of accidents were due to issues relating to equipment.
  3. Most common mechanism issues include: release mechanism, davit and wire/rope.
  4. 1 in every 5 accidents involved the boat/crew falling into the water.
  5. 1 in every 13 accidents happened when the lifeboat was in the stowed position.

Both studies point to the fact that the primary cause of lifeboat accidents is the failure of the equipment itself, particularly the release devices and davits, rather than human negligence. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has recently instructed its inspectors that they should not enter a lifeboat unless it can be demonstrated to the inspector that lifeboat release arrangements are correctly set and that all lashing and securing devices are in place. This requirement is a control mechanism that AMSA has implemented to reduce the inspector’s exposure to risk.

III. Measures to avoid accidents

As the lifeboats equipped on ships vary, the shifting crews may not always be familiar with them, and with lifeboats exposed to winds and waves all the time, the associated launch equipment is subject to corrosion. Where lifeboats are fitted also makes it difficult to carry out routine maintenance. Although specific requirements have been made for maintenance and thorough examination of lifeboats, launching appliances and release gear in Resolution MSC.404(96) and FPDs have been used in certain cases to prevent the unintentional release of a boat, the maritime community remains concerned about the lifeboat release gear currently in use and has called for attention on risks regarding lifeboat drills by all parties.

First, flag administrations should urge recognised organisations (classification societies) to ensure that the on-load release mechanism used on ships is in compliance with the various requirements of the LSA Code, which is actually a quality control of lifeboat equipment at the point of manufacturing.

Second, shipowners should make sure that all relevant information provided by the manufacturer should be available on board and a detailed procedure for lifeboat maintenance and drills be developed. All personnel carrying out inspections and maintenance of the lifeboat and associated equipment must be both fully trained in and familiar with said duties, preferably inspectors of the manufacturer. Unexpected problems can occur in practice, for example, where the lifeboat manual provided is for a series of products but not necessarily for the exact type; or the inspector attending on board is not sufficiently familiar with the equipment; or the third officer does not have the experience or capability to manage the equipment. The master should make sure the daily maintenance of the lifeboats and associated equipment is carried out in a coordinated way by different departments.

Third, the master should carry out proper training on the release and recovery of lifeboats and fully assess the risks before the drill. Do not start the drill in adverse weather or sea conditions and treat the drills just like real procedures with crew safety being the top priority. The Association’s loss prevention masters have found in previous ship visits that records of lifeboat inspections and drills were identical on some ships.

Further, all tests for safety and life-saving equipment must be conducted rigorously to guidelines so that potential hazards can be identified and reported in a timely manner and accidents can be avoided during drills and emergencies.

IV. Advice to Members

There are no statistics available to the shipping community showing that the probability of lifeboat drill accidents decreased throughout the period from the time of open lifeboats to totally enclosed lifeboats that came into widespread use in the late 1970s as the designing and manufacturing of lifeboats constantly improved. Conversely, it became more difficult for crews to carry out thorough maintenance of the increasingly complex lifeboat release gear in poor working conditions. The industry, like InterManager Secretary General commented, has for far too long “concentrated on blame and it is time we change our approach and go for the real root causes in order to stop lifeboat accidents once and for all.”

For more information, please contact Managers of the Association.