Following LP 29/2023 Security Situation Deteriorating in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, 10 more incidents were reported in the area. Despite the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces' Operation Prosperity Guardian in the waters, on December 31, the Maersk Hangzhou was attacked, and three small Yemeni Houthi vessels were sunk by helicopters from a U.S. destroyer patrolling in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, the boarding and hijacking of a Liberian cargo ship by armed pirates some 460 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia on the fourth day of the new year underscored the situation in the region. The Association has gathered the latest information on the shipping security situation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden for the reference of its members.

I. Recent security events

MSCHOA has updated 10 incidents in the region.

II. Threat Assessment

The Houtis are expected to persist in targeting ships linked to Israel’s interests along the Yemen coast, particularly in the southern Red Sea and the western part of the Gulf of Aden. “Israel interest” encompasses the ship’s flag, owner, operator, and cargo. While errors cannot be ruled out, it appears that the Houtis may be exploiting outdated information in some instances.

The assaults will likely consist primarily of drones and missiles. An attack sequence may start with a VHF communication, instructing the vessel to change its course toward a Houthi-controlled harbor. Noncompliance could lead to a kinetic assault. Direct boarding attempts, as seen in various instances, might not recur due to the forceful U.S. kinetic retaliation to the Maersk Hangzhou boarding attempt. The loss of three boats and ten crew members could deter further attacks of this nature.

Drone attacks are prevalent along the main navigation route off the west coast of Yemen, with a higher frequency on Sundays and Mondays based on current known cases. There has been no attack on Tuesday so far.

For Israeli-related ships sailing off the Yemen coast in the Red Sea and West GOA, MSCHOA recommended:

- Taking into account the risk balance between Safety and Security, consider minimizing information in the AIS data fields.

- Prefer night transit in the South Red Sea to avoid identification by skiffs or other supporting assets.

For all ships sailing off Yemen coasts:

- Choose routes far from the Yemeni coast (particularly avoiding the traffic separation scheme east of the Hanish Islands) and make a wide detour around the southern islands of the Red Sea.

- Only essential crew should remain on the navigation deck.

- Crewmembers should stay as far away as possible from the outside walls of the ship.

- Conduct a fire drill before reaching the Yemen coasts to check safety equipment.

- Register with MSCHOA (Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa).

III. Operation Prosperity Guardian

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) issued “Guidance for Shipping Navigating the Southern Red Sea (SRS)” on Dec. 23, announcing that an international naval force under the command of Combined Task Force 153 (CTF 153) will conduct a presence and deterrence mission as part of the Operation Prosperity Guardian. Warships will be patrolling in the vicinity of the Maritime Safe Transit Corridor (MSTC) to ensure the safe passage of merchant vessels and provide timely support in the event of an attack.

CMF threat assessment:

Types. Since 19 November, the Houthis have attacked or seized 13 merchant vessels, employing a variety of attack methods including, Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, One-way-attack Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (OWA UAVs) and, on one occasion, seizure of a vessel using a Helicopter. The Houthi have also previously demonstrated the capability and intent to use drone boats (Uncrewed Surface Vessels -- USVs) with mixed success.

Locality. Although the Houthis have made one successful attempt to fire missiles into the Gulf of Aden, towards the MV CENTRAL PARK when she was dead in the water following a piracy attack on 26 Nov 23, the predominate area of Houthi malign operations is the Southern Red Sea, concentrated in the vicinity of Al Hudaydah.

Target Selection. Since mid-November, the Houthis have steadily expanded their definition of viable targets. Specific targets are unclear, although we will endeavour to provide warning, via company security organisations, should we become aware of a merchant vessel being targeted, by name.

Targeting. The Houthis have so far demonstrated a limited capability to successfully attack vessels in the hours of darkness, although they do appear to be increasing in confidence with regards to flying their reconnaissance drones at night. Their targeting strategy and links to specific nations are difficult to confirm, and inconsistent.

CMF guidance:

• Reporting measures and information flow.

Ships entering and operating within the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) are encouraged to register with the UKMTO as identified on maritime security charts such as UKHO Q6099.

• Consideration of Day or Night transit.

Timings and navigation of SRS transit remain the vessel Master’s responsibility. Based on analysis of Houthi activity, it appears that UAVs are generally active during daylight hours. Transiting through the area to the west of Al Hudaydah during the hours of darkness may reduce the threat from UAV attack or frustrate efforts to target MV with missile systems. Although the detection of waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED) at night is difficult, it is also difficult for the Houthis to effectively direct them towards moving targets without visually identifying them.

• Use of AIS.

 Adherence to IMO AIS guidance / regulations remains the responsibility of the Ship Manger and Master. Ships with AIS switched on and off have been attacked. Switching off AIS makes it marginally more difficult to track or target a ship but may also hinder the ability of the military to provide support or direct contact.

• Actions in the Event of an Attack.

If contacted on VHF by “Yemeni Navy” and instructed to alter course to Al Hudaydah or another location on the NW coast of Yemen: a. Ignore the VHF call and continue on passage if safe to do so. b. Call for coalition warship on VHF Channel 16, inform them of your location, situation, state your intentions and seek advice. c. Contact UKMTO, own Company Security Officer and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command maritime operations centre at +973 1785 3879.

IV. Somalia piracy attacks

• On 04 January 2024, a Liberian merchant vessel was boarded and hijacked by 5-6 armed non-government personnel in the Indian Ocean, approximately 460 nautical miles east of Somalia (060506N 0571812E). The ship’s master reported that all crew members were assembled in the safety cabin and were safe for the time being.
• On 15 December 2023, the bulk carrier “Ruen” was taken hostage by pirates on the high seas of the Arabian Sea (120300N 06112000E), 600 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, and forced to sail to Somalia. It is now anchored off Raas Suud on the east coast of Somalia.
• On 26 November 2023, the Liberian tanker “Central Park” was boarded and hijacked off the western Gulf of Aden (1209N 04416E) and was successfully rescued after being stopped by a United States warship.

Since November 2023, Somali pirates have become active and have successfully boarded and hijacked three merchant ships. Some of the hijackings took place hundreds of nautical miles away from the Somali coast, indicating an upgrade in the pirates’ execution of attacks. Even though the waters off Somalia was removed as High-Risk Area, ships sailing through this area should make anti-piracy preparations with reference to industry guidelines such as BMP5, and consider use of the IRTC and convoys.

The MSCHOA Red Sea Maritime Security Threat Update and CMF’s Guidance for Shipping Navigating the Southern Red Sea can be found here:

https://on-shore.mschoa.org/latest-news-bulletins-and-information-of-interest-for-seafarers/

https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.com/media/1062/2023-12-23-cmf-advice-to-mariners-01_23.pdf

For more information, please contact Managers of the Association.