In response to Israel’s attack on Lebanon and its aerial bombardment of the Yemeni ports of Hodeidah and Ras al-Issa, the Houthis resumed their attacks on merchant ships sailing in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden after nearly four weeks of silence. The oil tanker CORDELIA MOON and the bulk carrier MINOAN COURAGE were attacked consecutively on October 1^st and sustained varied degrees of damage, but no one was injured. With escalation of conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the risks of navigating the waters of the Red Sea have again attracted widespread attention in shipping. This article thus is prepared to assist Members and crews with detailed planning and adequate risk assessment, with reference to the JMIC dashboard and the Interim Industry Transit Advice Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

I. Recent attacks

M.T CORDELIA MOON, according to the ship’s Master, in the morning at 150828N/0414537E, three projectiles landed near the ship’s port bow and later a fourth projectile splashed the aft starboard quarter. The vessel was finally hit by a USV on its port side, resulting in damage to the hull, but did not affect the stability of the vessel, and no injuries were reported, and the vessel was able to maintain its course.

M.V MINOAN COURAGE, which was attacked at almost the same time as the tanker CORDELIA MOON at 153700N/0412600E, was first reported by the Master of CORDELIA MOON. Subsequently, the Master of MINOAN COURAGE reported a missile strike on the aft starboard, damaging the engine compartment. The vessel was adrift with all crew members safe. The ship proceeded with its voyage after engine restoration and emergency assessment.

II. JMIC weekly dashboard

1. Number of incidents

There has been a total of 102 attacks since 19 November 2023. Most of the ships attacked earlier were associated with Israel, the US and the UK, but since May most of the ships attacked had no direct association with the countries and may be attacked as other vessels within the company structure have made one or more recent port calls to Israel. There have also been instances of mistaken attack, as in the case of the bulk carrier MINOAN COURAGE, which was probably hit by mistake during the attack targeted on the oil tanker CORDELIA MOON.

2. Vessel types and stakeholders

The main types of vessels attacked were tankers, bulk carriers and container ships, with a percentage of 36%, 33% and 26% respectively. 49% of the incidents involved ships directly associated to Israel, the US and the UK, 15% had outdated association, and 36% had no direct association, including those other ships within the company structure that have made one or more recent calls to Israeli ports.

3. AIS statistics

Vessels attacked with their AIS on and off were 50:50, so it does not appear to have an impact on whether or not a vessel will be targeted. However, if targeted, based on the available data vessels with AIS off are less likely to be hit.

4. Incident types

Of all the incidents since 19 November 2023, 77 were carried out by missiles, 18 by UAV drones, 15 by small crafts, 13 by USV/WBIEDs and 5 were hijacks. The USV attacks occurred mainly in the southern Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.

III. Interim industry transit advice

In response to escalating security concerns in the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, leading maritime organisations BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF released on 24 September the latest Interim Industry Transit Advice, covering everything from voyage planning to real-time threat response and post-incident management. It included types of current threats, voyage planning and routing considerations, ship hardening, AIS considerations, considerations regarding armed guards, naval protection, military recommendations regarding suspicious communications and incident responses.

The advice points out that threats to ships include:

• Houthi forces masquerading as Yemeni Coastguard or Navy officials and attempting to coerce merchant ships to sail to Yemeni ports.
• Anti-ship cruise missiles. These missiles have sophisticated terminal guidance typically by means of radar and/or electro-optics.
• Anti-ship ballistic missiles. These missiles are typically aimed at a geographical coordinate or have only basic, unreliable terminal guidance.
• Water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED) also known as Uncrewed Surface Vessel (USV). Typically, skiffs occasionally mounted with dummies, fitted with an impact fuse and laden with explosives.
• Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, or drones) are occasionally used.
• Crewed skiffs using RPGs and small arms.
• Uncrewed undersea vehicles have been reported, but no vessel has been attacked using these.
• Mines are near entrances to Houthi-controlled ports, and on rare occasions, mines have become detached from their tether and have drifted into the traffic lanes.
• Houthi hijack/kidnap teams in skiffs.
• Houthi hijack/kidnap teams in helicopters. Although the possibility of an airborne attack from helicopters during darkness exists, it is more significant during daylight hours.

The JMIC Weekly Dashboard and the Interim Industry Transit Advice can be found below:

https://www.ukmto.org/partner-products/jmic-products/weekly-dashboard

https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.com/media/xm1jsgjg/2024-09-24-interim-industry-transit-advice-srs-goa.pdf

IV. Advice to Members

1. All information available, including any additional advice from the flag State, information and navigational advice issued by UKMTO/JMIC/MSCHOA, ship’s operating records, industry guidance, and etc should be utilized to fully assess the risks when planning for voyages to the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Based on the assessment, decide whether to cancel the voyage or take adequate preventive and contingency measures.

2. With reference to recent attacks, when assessing whether the vessel would be targeted, consider not only whether the vessel is directly associated with Israel, the US and the UK, or whether it has recently called at an Israeli port, consider also whether it has previous associated with Israel, the US and the UK , or if any other vessel within the company structure has called at Israeli ports. Sail as far away from other ships as possible in case being hit by mistake.

3. Contact the insurer for additional war risk cover or single voyage cover before sailing to the listed areas. Consult the FD&D insurer and/or lawyer, if the vessel is under a charterparty, to assess whether it would be reasonable not to proceed to the area, and, if not, whether it is possible to request the charterer to reimburse the shipowner for the war risk premium for executing the charterer’s order to sail to the listed area. However, disputes may arise as the amount of addition premium can vary as insurers assess the risks differently.

4. Ships sailing through the waters of the Southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden should take adequate preparations and precautions, taking into account the JMIC Weekly Dashboard, the Interim Industry Transit Advice, the CMF Guidance for Shipping Navigating the Southern Red Sea, the JMIC Bridge Emergency Reference Card, and industry guidelines such as BMP5, as well as the risk alerts issued by the Association.

5. Incidents of GPS interference and AIS spoofing have been reported frequently in the waters of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. In addition to closely monitoring the ship’s position by the crew, shipowners are advised to equip the vessels with different global satellite navigation systems or multimode receivers with satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS).

For more information, please contact Managers of the Association.