On 13 June 2025, Israel started a wave of strikes on Iran. Iranian and Israeli tit-for-tat strikes are expected. The ongoing conflict could have spillover effects for commercial maritime traffic, but direct impacts are likely to remain limited. Despite reports of a ceasefire between the U.S., Israel, and Iran, the maritime industry should remain on high alert. Conflicting statements and continued hostilities highlight the fragility of the situation. While the media reports cautious optimism, they do not constitute a reliable basis for reducing security measures. Underlying geopolitical tensions remain unresolved, and threats from the Houthis persist. Electronic interference and the strategic vulnerability of key choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz further underscore the ongoing risks.

I. Risk Intelligence Threat Assessment Persian Gulf 252025

Overnight 21-22 June 2025, the US conducted strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities to unknown, but likely significant, effect. This prompted Iranian lawmakers gathered on 22 June to vote on closing the Strait of Hormuz. The decision must be put to a second vote by the Iranian National Security Council, before any military orders may be issued. The outcome of that vote is not a guarantee.

How that closure would take shape is unknown as of writing, but given limited knowledge of Iranian priorities and considerations, a closure is unlikely to be total, and likely to allow selected flags and partners through a semi-formal embargo. This could mean a closure along the lines of the Houthi embargo in the Bab el Mandeb, which has proven a success with limited impact on Iran's and the Persian Gulf Arabs’ most important trade partners, all located in Asia.

Emerging elements indicate a preference towards targeting US, UK, French and German military vessels in the Persian Gulf.

In response to Israel’s air strikes, Iran has relatively limited options for retaliation. Currently, the impact on the maritime transit remains limited, but there is a significant risk of escalation of conflicts. It is worth noting that Israel has launched attacks on targets in the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.

The threat is currently high in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman of possible incidents affecting merchant vessels, and could include direct attacks against vessels, or the seizure and detention of vessels, and could be higher for vessels linked to Israel through ownership.

II. JMIC Advisory Note Update 013

As of Tuesday, June 24, 2025, the strategic situation in the Strait of Hormuz and broader Middle East remains uncertain. Commercial maritime traffic continues to flow through the SoH, but with reduced numbers recorded for 23 June. There remains no impact to commercial shipping; however, due to the uncertainty of maritime security the maritime domain threat remains ELEVATED.

JMIC continues to receive questions regarding the Strait of Hormuz and Iran-US Tensions. What they currently know is:

• Ongoing Hostilities: Iranian missile launches towards Israel and Israeli strikes in Tehran occurred after the declared ceasefire commencement.
• Electronic Interference: Persistently higher levels of electronic interference, particularly affecting GNSS systems, continue to be experienced throughout a larger section of the region.
• Threat of SoH Closure: Remains unknown.

III. Windward Data Jun 19,2025

1. According to Windward data, between June 15-18, an average of 972 ships per day experienced GPS jamming. The interference peaked on June 17^th, affecting 1,155 ships.
2. Among the approximately 900 ships targeted on the 18^th were at least 120 tankers over 10,000 deadweight tonnes, including 27 very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and 24 containerships.
3. From June 13-15, around 1,000 ships were found to have had their AIS signals erroneously manipulated.

       Windward has identified three distinct GPS interference zones:

• Within Qatar’s territorial waters.
• In international waters along shipping lanes to and from Iraq and Kuwait en route to the Strait of Hormuz.
• Within the traffic separation lanes during Hormuz transits.

4. Electronic interference is redirecting AIS signals to areas near Asaluyeh and Bandar Abbas in Iran, as well as off the coast of Oman. Some vessels’ signals are also being redirected near Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, as they transit the strait. 

IV. Advice for Members

Based on above analysis of the current Israel-Iran situation and following safety guides by industry organizations, the Association advises the following.

1. Follow the technical guidance as provided in BMP-MS and by industry organizations.
2. Continuously monitor credible intelligence sources and official government channels for real-time updates, as the situation can change rapidly.
3. Maintain close contact with the war risk insurer and check for any restrictive clauses in the war risks insurance arranged by charterer for the vessel.
4. Perform detailed, vessel-specific, and voyage-specific risk assessments for any transit through the region, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, Arabian Gulf, and Red Sea.
5. Ensure Robust Contingency Planning. Have clear plans for rerouting, emergency response, crew welfare, and communication in the event of renewed escalation or incident.
6. Maintain Vigilant Lookouts. Employ enhanced visual lookouts and rely more heavily on radar-based navigation.
7. Use the combination of AIS and VHF with caution when coordinating collision avoidance. Stick to the rules to prevent collisions as interfered AIS signal could incorrectly identify targets and lead to collisions.
8. Closely monitor GPS and ECDIS alarms. The captain should organize training on using ECDIS to assist navigation and positioning as well as using of radar and landmarks to ensure safety.

For more information, please contact Managers of the Association.